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a corporation, and PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION OF UTAH,
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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
l'TAH PARKS COMP ANY,

a <'orporation,

- vs. -

Plaintiff,

KKNrr FR.OST CANYONLAND TOURS,

a ('orporation, and PUBLIC SERVICE
CO~lMJSSION

OF UTAH,

Case No.
10635

Defendants.

J\I ITC HELL l\I. -WILLIAMS, dba Tag_\-Long Tours,
Plaintiff,

- vs. -

KENT FROST CANYONLAND TOURS,
a corporation, and PUBLIC SE.RVICE
COi\11\fTSSION OF UTAH,

Case No.
10636

Defendants.

Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing
and Brief in Support Thereof
PETITION FOR REHEARING
Ftah Parks Company, a corporation, and Mitchell
j\J. \Yilliams, dba Tag-A-Long Tours, each a plaintiff in
tht> above entitled case, hereby jointly and respectfully
pdition the court for a rehearing of the above case upon
tlw following grounds and for the following reasons:

2

1. This court erroneously misconstrued the fact;
shown by the record in this case and misapplied the law
applicable to said facts and to the record made before
the Commission.

2. This court erroneously held that findings and
evidence in prior cases were "in effect made a part of
the record in the case being heard" and upon erroneously
holding that ''That was done here," further erroneously
held that such matters "may be considered as evidence";
and in doing so erred in holding that there was competent evidence to support the Commission's findings with
n'spect to the instant case.
3. This court erroneously concluded and held that
plaintiffs' main complaint about evidence was that the
Commission could not properly consider findings in other
cases before it.
4. This court entirely misconstrued, if not totally
ignored, the objection to the Commission's order as urged
by the plaintiff, Utah Parks Company, the main basis
of which was that there was absolutely no evidence of
any kind in the record justifying the extension of applicant's authority in the four southwestern counties.

WILLIAM S. RICHARDS
A. U. MINER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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I 'L~\ I Nri1IFFS' BRUJF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION

FOR REHEARING

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Plaintiff will for purposes of this petition and brief
<'On::;ider this matter as one case as was done by the court
in its opinion, although originally docketed in this court
nnd<->r two separate case numbers 10635 and 10636.
'L1lw facts of the case have been stated quite fully in
va«h of plaintiffs' original briefs and in many respects
again stated in defendants' brief; but in view of the fact
that this court has misconstrued some of those facts, we
will in our argument make further reference thereto as
lwromes necessary.
]~mphasis

and italics are ours throughout.
ARGUMENT
POINTS I, II AND III

Plaintiffs' Points I, II and III as stated in this petition for rehearing are so closely related that plaintiffs
will treat them together.
Tlw court in the main "holding" portion of its opinion referred to the case of Utah Power & Light vs. Public
Ptilities Commission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542, and
1'tated that "if the record in the other case is called to
tht> attention of the Corrunission so that it is in effect
made a part of tlw rt>eord in the case being heard, which
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thus gives notice to adverse parties and allows them
opportunity to meet it, it may be considered as evidence."
The court then held: "'l'hat was done here." Tlwn•in thi::::
court erred and failed to understand or properly read
the record as made before the Commission. We re::;pectfully state that that was NOT done here. If matters of
record from prior ca,ses had been called to the attentio11
of the C01n11iission and if such prior matters had been
"in effect niade a vart of the record in the case being
heard," then plaintiffs as adverse parties would have
had ::;ome notice and would have had an opportunity to
meet any adverse effect. But as stated by the plaintiff,
Utah Parks Company, on page G of its original brief
"Applicant tried to introditce findings aud orders in other
cases, BUT THIS \VAS DENIED BY THE COMMISSION * * *."
The applicant never even purported to offer in evidence any factual matters from prior cases. His only
offer - which was denied by the Commission Examiner
-was to introduce CONCLUSIONS and THEORIES of
parties in prior cases. There had been no transcript of
evidence reproduced from those prior cases, and applicant merely tried to show theories advanced by those
prior parties, as well as some conclusions drawn therefrom. The record reads as follows:
(R. 5) "MR. MACFARJL,ANE: ***Byway,
briefly, of background at the commencement of
this hearing, I would like to move the commission
to take judicial notice of its findings in cases No.
5554, 5436 "MR. SOHM: Identify the cases by the parties too, would you 1"
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:\l r. M aeFarlane then repeated the numbers with the
nanH·s of the applicants. The record continues:
"l\lR. RICH ARDS: At this tinw the protestant ~I itehell ~I. \Villi ams dba Tag-A-Long
Tours and the protestant Canyon Country Scenic
Tonrs would object to the motion of applicant to
have the commission take judicial notiee of findings in any prior matters. I believe that this partieular proC'eeding has to stand on its own merits
and that the commission cannot take judicial
knowledge of findings in prior matters but can
only takl' judicial knowledge of its orders issued
in those partieular matters, or certificates issued
in conneetion "'ith those matters and further that
tlwrP are numerous parties rn·psent in this hearing today who werP not presPnt in the matters
ref erred to.

"ThHSrS vV ARR: This latter comment applies
to my client and I would resist any such motion
by reason of the fact I did not participate in those
hearings and have no knowledge of what transpired nor have had opportunity to cross examine
witnesses who may have testified at those proceedings.
"MR. MACFARLANE: Just for purposes
of clarification, Irene, I would like to state that
thosP findings do not have any particular bearing

so far as facts are concerned in any of the CO'Wnties in which your client is authorized to serve a;nd
thP1J relatf only to the coitnties which were affectPcl 7Jy thP application then before the commission. * * *"

\YP must point out to the court here that these

"eounties whieh 'IYPre affected by the application then
hdon' tlw Counnission" were counties in southeastern
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l ~tah and did not include the four southwestern counties of \Vashington, ] ron, Garfield and Kane.
The record continues:
"MR. l\IACF ARLANE: * * * Also I am not
offering in evidence - I would like to offer in
evidence the evidence received at those other proceedings but I am not doing that. I am just asking the commission now to take judicial notice of
its findings in its official report and order which
are on file, which I think go an awfully long way
in showing the theory of the parties who now appear as both petitioners and protestants as far
as the tour business is concerned."
l\Ir. l\Iiner on behalf of Utah Parks Company urged
the same objection as stated by l\Iiss Warr because Utah
Parks Company had not participated in the prior hearmgs. rl1he record continues: P. 7
"MR. SOHM: I will consider the matter submitted and defer any rulings since I can't do so.
My off-hand thinking is that it would be a problem to incorporate those in this proceeding in any
way. We could take notice of them for some specific purposes, I am sure, but as far as evidencewise, it would be difficult.
"MR. MACFARLANE: I am not asking that
they be made a part of the proceeding. I am asking that the commission take judicial notice."
The attorney for applicant then went on to discuss
"the theory of the applicant" in prior proceedings. This
was not a matter of evidence but merely a question of
theory; and, after some argument, a discussion was had
off the record (R. 10) after which the examiner stated:
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( R. 10) "l\lR. SOHl\l: Let's proceed then with
th<' taking of the e>vidence."
At tlw conelusion of applieant's case and before the
pn'sPntation of any evidenc(~ on behalf of these plaintiffs or any other protestant, Mr. l\facFarlane on behalf
of thP applicant made the following offer:
(R 101 and R. 102) "MR. MACFARLANE:
Prior to thP close of the record I would like to
move that the report and order in Cases Numbers
5554 and 5436 Sub 2 and 5098 Sub 1 be made a
part of this record, not only for the purpose of
showing the authorjty of the parties who are all
parties to these proceedings, that is the parties to
thosP casPs, but also the legal theories and conclusions upon which the authorities were granted. I
make the motion separately as to each case."

Ohjection was made on behalf of plaintiffs and all
othPr iirotestants not only as to the propriety or competPncy of admitting such matters as evidence, but up-0n
tlJP hasis that most of the parties presently protesting
WPrt' not in the other cases, had no opportunity to cross
Pxamine witnesses, nor to produce opposing evidence.
In other words, the effect of such objections was that
tlH'l'P was no \Vay that protestants could meet any of
:-;nd1 matters should they be considered as evidence.
\Yhereupon, the examiner stated:

(R. 103) "MR. SOHM: I think they should
be made a part of the file as far as showing the
authority lntt I will deny the motion a s to showing
the purposes by which the authority was issued."
1

'l'herPafter, l\Ir. MacFarlane re-opened his case but
only for the purpose of putting on a witness named Victor
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\Yilkins for tl'Stimony v»ith n':->lH'.ct to matters in thtarea of Carbon, Uintah and DuchPsnp Counties, norn~ of
which was involved in the matter lwfore this honorable
C'ourt because the examiner deniPd any authority with
respect to those counties.
After concluding with the witnPss \Vilkins, ~Ir. _MacF'arlane having rested on behalf of applicant, the protestants then presented evidence on their own behalf.
The evidence, including any fi11di11gs or conclusions, in
prior cases, not having been either directly nor "in effect
made a 17art of the record of the case l)(:ing heard," plaintiffs here were not given notice and were not called upon
to meet an:' of such matters with any opposing evidence.
1'hert>forP, as the matter was concluded, it was entirely
contrary to the statement of this court in its opinion
included in the following:

"* * * that if the rPcord in the other case is
called to the attention of the Commission so that
it is in effect made part of the record in the case
being heard, which thus gives notice to adverse
parties and allo-ws them an opportunity to meet
it, it may be considered as evidence. That was
done here * * *."
\Ve again respectfully insist THAT WAS NOT
DONE HERE.
From the time that Mr. Sohm, the Commission Examiner, denied the motion to incorporate into this record
the reports and orders of prior cases, insofar as they
''show the purposes by which the authority was issued,''
the plaintiffs not only lost their opportunity to meet any
such evidence because it was expressly excluded and was
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11ot 11i::HlP a part of tlw rPconl, hut hy the same token

tltP plaintiff's abo 1\·ere relievPd from anv• ohlio·ation
to
b
prnduee opposing PvidPnce to llH'(•t anything that may
lw eontainPd in such reports, orders or conclusions.

ThPn' is no \:'sca1w from the conclusion that in the issuane<> of tlw certificate as issuPd herein the Commission
<·nwl in considering :mch mattPrs or such prior reports
or onlers for an:-' purpos<:> other than as stated by Exami11<•r Sohm, for tlw purposP of "showing the authority"
which had been issued to those prior applicants.
The attempt on the part of this Supreme Court to
altPr the record as it has done in the instant matter is
an attempt to "cut the pattern to fit the cloth" and is
('nntrary to all prior court rulings, including the two
eases cied in its opinion. \Ve again refer to the case of
Los Ang(~les & Salt Lake R.R. Co. vs. Public Utilities
( 'ornmission, Sl Utah 2SG, 17 P.2d 287, where this court
states:
"'~ * * hut it cannot take its special knowledge
\\·hich it may have gained from experience or from
otlwr hearings and base any findings or conclusions upon such knowledge. That is fundamental.
In Atchison, T. & S. Ry. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 335 Ill. G2-1-, 167 N.K 831, page 837, it
was held: 'The commissioners cannot act on their
own information. Their findings must be based on
evidence presented in the case, with an opportunity to all parties to know of the evidence to be
submitted or considered, to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents and to offer evidence
in explanation or rebuttal, and nothing can be
treated as evidence which t·s not introduced as
1

such.'"
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POINrr IV
Tlll<~RI~ \VAS NO EVIDI<JNCI~ \VHATSOEVER BEARINO ON THE FOUR SOUTH\VESTERN UTAH CO UNTIES.

Thjl'.-l court in the third paragraph of its opm1on
stated that plaintiff's objt:'ctions to the authority as issued were "that it fails to prokct existing services; that
there is insufficient evidence to show public conveniencP
and necessity; and that the findings and order are based
on hearsay and incompetent evidence." It is true that
both plaintiffs urged the first two matters as statPd.
Plaintiff \Villiams urged the one "hearsay and incornpeh·nt evidence"; but that applied solely to the southeastern area around the Colorado river and Lake Powell
an~as and had no reference whatsoever to the four south'vestern counties. Mr. Williams, dba Tag-A-Long Tours,
also held authorit~" and protested with respect to KanP
and Garfield Counties; and the plaintiff, Utah Parks
Company, lwld authority only in the four southwestern
Utah counties and protested only with respect to such
four southwestern counties of Vv ashington, Iron, Garfield and Kane. Now here in the brief or presentation on
behalf of Utah Parks Company was any objection made
or any charge urged that the order was "based on hearsay or incompetent evidence."
The main portion of the brief of plaintiff, Utah
Parks Company, and the major objection urged was that
"THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENCE SUBSTANTIAL OR OTHER\VISE CONTAINEU IN TH:b:
RECORD" with respect to the four southwestern counties. "rrHERI~ \VAS NO'r OXE \VORD OF TESTI-
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\10:\Y \VlTH HESPJ,_;('T TO ANY PROSPEC'rIVE

OR AXY REQrESTS OR ANY PUBLIC DE.MAND OR E\'EN INDICA11 ED DESIRE FOR
,\NY SUCH SERVICE ANY\VHERE IN EITHER OF
Tin~ FOUR SOUTH\VES'fERN COUN'rIES OF GARI•'fELD, KANE, IRON AND \VASHINGTON.'' (Utah
Parks' brief, pages G and 7) At pages 10 and 11 of the
original hrid' of Utah Parks Company th1:~ record shows
(·0111plt>te and specific questions asked as to whether applicant had ever had any requests from anyone for servi('P of any kind in any of the areas of Kane, Garfield,
Iron or \Vashington Counties, and each question was
answ1:~red with a categorical "No."
('t'STO~IERS

\Y( think that the case relied on and cited by this
court, the case of Utah Power & Light vs. Public Utilities
Commission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P.2d 542, should be compelling to require the court to reverse the decision of the
Commission in this case. In that Utah Power & Light
C'ase the court did sustain the Commission because it
found that
3

''in no instance are any of the material findings
or conclusions made by the Commission without
other supporting cornpetent evidence. For this
reason we are not inclined to reverse this case for
this error * * * ."
f n the case at bar there is not one bit of "other support-

ing evidence'' of any kind, ''hearsay and incompetent,''
or otherwise, upon which the Commission could base any
favorable finding or order with respect to the four south\\'estern Utah counties.
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EvPn though this court in the Utah PowPr & Light
case decided not to rPvPnw that case for such error, tlH·
court went on immediately to state:

"1- his is, howt•ver, the third tinw that this
question has been befon> this court and we havl'
condemned this conduct in unmistakable terms.
1

This practicr slumld not be followed in the future."

If the practice of incorporating records of prior
ca~ws into a later case should thus be condemned and not
followed, there is all the more reason why this court
should eondemn a practice of basing findings and an
ordPr uvon matters which were NOT "in effect made a
part of the record in tlw case being heard," and in connection with ·which plaintiffs were therefore not given
any notice nor were they given any opportunity to meet
such "evidence."

rrhis court misconstrues the record and the presPntati on in the briefs of plaintiffs when it says:
''Plaintiffs' main complai1it about evidence is
that the Commission could not properly com;ider
findings and orders in otlwr cases before it."
Plaintiffs did complain that the Commission should
not havt• considered these other findings; but that was
not our main complaint. Our complaint was based upon
the fact that these other findings had not been admitted
nor ''in pffect made a part of the record"; but, nevertheless, after excluding them from evidence the Commission
went ahead and based its findings and conclusions wholly
on matters which it had excluded and which it thereforP
had indieated would not he consid(•red h~, it. SUCH If-;
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B~RROR BY ALL AUTHORITY, INCLUDING NUMEROUS PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT.

ln the cas<~ of Spencer vs. Industrial Commission,
:.\l Utah 511, 20 P.2d 618, cited in the ca::;e of Utah Power
& Light Co. vs. Public Utilitie::; Commission, supra, the
SuprPrne Court of Utah hit the nail on the head when
it stated:
"rI'hti rnle applicahle to judicial proceedings
is that, ~while a court may take judicial notice of
the proceedings and records in the cause before
it, the court cannot in one case take judicial notice
__jof its own records in another and different case.
E n v. Kelly, 69 Utah 376, 255 P. -±30.
"\Ve recognize that the Industrial Commission is not a court and is not bound by the usual
common law or statutory rules of evidence or by
the technical or formal rules of procedure. Comp.
Laws Utah 1917, Sec. 31-±9. Yet, it is fundamental
that in invesigations such as the Industrial Commission is authorized to make, any party to a
cause or proceedings is entitled to be advised of
and afforded an opportunity to meet such evidence as the commission may consider and rely
on in the making of its findings and decision.
Unless such evidence is brought into the case, and
in some lawful manner made a part of the record,
it cannot be regarded as competent evidence, and
niust be excluded in determining the sufficiency
of the evidence to support the findings of the Ind11strial Comniission. * * *"
As the record affirmatively discloses, the evidence
upon which the Commission relies and upon which the
Supreme Court itself bases its decision is taken from the
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findings of fact and eonclusions in prior lffOCPedings,
u'71ich findings of fact aud co11clusions 1rere expressly
e.rcludcd lJ.IJ the Commissio-n at t71e time of the hearing.
Once said faets were exeluded, it was no longer incumbent and in fact would havt~ been improper for protestants to try and meet the excluded evidence.
It is novel for the Supreme Court to conclude that
other questions relating to rulings on evidence have no
significant importance when it is apparent from the record that there is absolutely no evidence of convenience
and necessity. Such an approach makes nothing but a
rubber stamp out of the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah, with respect to Commission hearings and allows
tht> PSCU to entirely ignore the statutory law of the
State of Uta11 with respect to the issuance of certificates
of convenience and necessity. If these statutes - as
well as prior decisions with respect thereto - are to bt>
changed or disregarded, then it should be by legislative
action and not otherwise.
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COXCLFSIO~

\Ye n•spectfully urge that this court m its opm10n
111is<·onstrut>d the facts shown by the record in this case
and misapplied the law applicable to such facts b€cause
tlJP findings and conclusions in other cases which had
lw<>n heard hdore the Counnission were not in any way
"111ade a part of the record in the case being heard";
that there ·was no evidence of any kind with respect to
tlw four southwestern counties of vVashington, Iron, Garfield and Kane, and there was no proper or competent
(•vidence to support a finding of convenience and necessity with respect to any area involved in the application.
\Ve respectfully urge that this court grant a rehearing and upon such rehearing that this court cancel and
sd aside the order issued by the Commission.
Respectfully submitted,

"WILLIAM S. RICHARDS
A. U. MINER
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

